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HARRY KALVEN, JR.

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY

I. THE PROBLEM
The United States Supreme Court had no occasion to pass on
the constitutionality of legislation making obscenity a crime for more
than one hundred and fifty years after the adoption of the First
Amendment. Within the last five years, however, the Court has been
confronted with and decided most of the principal questions relating
to the problem. It has thus defined a body of law which has rich interest for lawyer and layman alike, and has developed constitutional doctrine with major implications transcending the immediate problem.
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the Court's recent
opinions' in order to see how it has resolved the perplexities inherent
in the problem of the validity of such legislation and to see what is2
sues, if any, remain to be decided.
Harry Kalven, Jr., is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Kingsley Pictures Inc. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); and Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959). One other major decision, Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957), dealing primarily with the constitutionality of prior restraints, falls outside the
scope of this article.
2 For general discussions of obscenity and the law, see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of
Obscene Literature,52 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1937); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law
of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954); Symposium: Obscenity and
the Arts, 20 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 531 (1955); ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE
LAw (1956); Kalven, Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 769 (1957), 27 LIBRARY Q. 201
(1957).
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Although it has been argued that the utterance of obscenity was a
common-law crime, 3 early instances are infrequent and, at best, ambiguous. The publication of obscene matter does not clearly emerge
as a crime in England until the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in
1857.4 American legislation comes a few years later under the crusading impetus of Anthony Comstock., During the early part of the
twentieth century there were judicial decisions, principally from
Massachusetts, which laconically assumed the constitutionality of
such legislation; 6 but most of these decisions antedate the constitutional doctrines of free speech developed by the Supreme Court in the
period from Schenck7 to Yates.8 Thus, the law of obscenity regulation
seems to have had a kind of "sleeper" development, outside the main
stream of decisions dealing with the problems of freedom of speech,
until recently two distinguished lower court judges were met with the
dilemma of reconciling the theories underlying the free-speech cases
with the decisions sustaining obscenity regulation. Judge Curtis Bok,
in Commonwealth v. Gordon,9 and Judge Jerome Frank, in United
States v. Roth' 0 both found the problem perplexing, and Judge Frank's
opinion reads like a personal plea to the Supreme Court to resolve the
constitutional difficulties."
The constitutional problems are primarily of two kinds. The first
revolves around the ambiguity of the term "obscenity." The lack of
3
The English history is reviewed in Alpert, supra note 2, at 40-53, and in ST. JoHNSTEvAs, 6p. cit. supra note 2, at 18-29.

4 20 & 21 Vict., c. 83 (1857).

5 There were scattered American cases, however, prior to the Civil War. See Lockhart
& McClure, supranote 2, at 324 and n. 200.
6See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57 (1917); see also Grant & Angoff,
Massachusettsand Censorship III, 10 B. U. L. REv. 147 (1930).

7 294 U.S. 47 (1919).
8 354 U.S. 298 (1958).

9 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949).
10237 F. 2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956). Judge Frank, after entering a concurring opinion (id.
at 801-6), added an appendix of twenty pages in which he detailed his difficulties (id. at
806-27). He had anticipated some of the problems in his opinion in Roth v. Goldman,
172 F. 2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1948). Mention should be made also of the opinion of Judge
Arnold, in Esquire v. Walker, 151 F. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd sub. nor. Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
U The Frank opinion is a remarkable judicial performance and deserves wide reading.
I have attempted to indicate my respect-and gratitude-for it in Kalven, Book Review,
supra note 2.
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precision had in no way been abated by the slow evolution of the test
for obscenity, from the measure of the impact of isolated passages on
the susceptible--the formula provided by the leading English case of
Queen v. Hicklin12 in 1868-to the standard of the impact of the whole
upon the average member of the audience, a doctrine worked out by
Judges Woolsey and Learned Hand in Kennerley,13 Levine, 14 and
"Ulysses."' 5 At the time the problem came to the Supreme Court it
could still be argued with some force that the term was irreducibly
vague and that all definitions were circular-a poor predicate for a
law inhibiting free speech. It may be possible to distinguish between
degrees of explicitness in discussions of sex, but among explicit discussions of sex it is heroic to attempt to distinguish the good from the
bad. Nor were the contemporary decisions of the state courts reassuring: Massachusetts, in 1945, held that the fine, compassionate
novel by Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit, was obscene;" at about the
same time, it held that Forever Amber was not.' 7 And the New York
and Massachusetts courts had reached opposite conclusions about
8
Erskine Caldwell's Gods Little Acre.'
The second group of constitutional doubts derived from the clearand-present-danger test. Toward what dangers was obscenity legislation directed? Analysis reveals four possible evils: (1) the incitement
to antisocial sexual conduct; (2) psychological excitement resulting
- L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1868). The famous test appears in the opinion of Lord Cockburn,
at 371.
"3United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
11United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
1 United States v. One Book "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), af'.d, 72
F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). Judge Woolsey's opinion is probably the most widely known
of all judicial decisions on obscenity, but its concern is with the evaluation of Joyce's
work and not with constitutional issues. Judge Woolsey handled the literary critic
aspect of his assignment with wit, compassion, and charm, observing: "The words which
are criticized as dirty are old Saxon words known to-almbst all men and, I venture, to
many women, and are such words as would be naturally and habitually used, I believe, by
the types of folk whose life, physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe. In respect
to the recurrent emergence of the theme of sex in the minds of his characters, it must always be remembered that his locale was Celtic and his season spring." 5 F. Supp. at 18384.
1 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543 (1945).
17Attorney General v. "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302 (1948).
1s People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813 (Mag. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1933) (not obscene);
Attorney General v. "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281 (1950) (obscene).
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from sexual imagery; (3) the arousing of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and (4) the advocacy of improper sexual values.9 All present
difficulties. It is hard to see why the advocacy of improper sexual values should fare differently, as a constitutional matter, from any other
exposition in the realm of ideas. Arousing disgust and revulsion in a
voluntary audience seems an impossibly trivial base for making
speech a crime. The incitement of antisocial conduct, the point at
which Judges Bok and Frank directed most of their fire, evaporates in
light of the absence of any evidence to show a connection between the
written word and overt sexual behavior. 20 There remains the evil of
arousing sexual thoughts short of action. There is no doubt that the
written word can excite the imagination. What puzzled Judge Bok
and amused Judge Frank was the idea that the law could be so solemnly concerned with the sexual fantasies of the adult population.2 1
The movement of obscenity cases to the Court took an ironic turn
in 1947. The New York Court of Appeals held that Edmund Wilson's
Memoirs of Hecate County was obscene. 22 Here was an ideal test case,
involving a serious book by the country's most distinguished literary
critic. The New York Court of Appeals had disposed of the case
without opinion and without dissent, stating "that the conviction
19 It is possible to assert a fifth evil: the impact of obscenity on character and hence,
slowly and remotely, on conduct. Mr. Justice Harlan recognizes this possibility in his

opinion in Roth, 354 U.S. at 502.
20 The evidence is summarized in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2; ST. JoHN-STEvA s,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 196-202; and in the Frank opinion in Roth,

237 F. 2d at 812-17.
See also McKEoN, MERTON, & GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM To READ 71-78 (1957). While

there is no persuasive evidence that exposure to obscenity triggers action, there is also, it
must be admitted, no persuasive evidence that it does not. One view on the point has been
captured in two well-known bon mots. The first is the remark attributed to Mayor James
J.Walker of New York, that no nice girl was ever ruined by a book. The second is the

comment by Macaulay: "We find it difficult to believe that in a world so full of temptations as this, any gentleman whose life would have been virtuous if he had not read
Aristophanes or Juvenal, will be vicious by reading them." Both are quoted at 237 F. 2d
812.
21

Itis one of the ironies of discussion of obscenity that it has been too polite to put the
point that must be involved. The talk is of "arousing sexual thoughts." Presumably what
is meant is a physiological (sexual) response to a picture or the written word. And one
suspects that the real fear is one that everyone, except Anthony Comstock, has been too
reticent to mention, the fear of masturbation. See Kalven, Book Review, supra note 2; see
also BROUN & LEECH, ANTHONY ComsrocK-RouNDSMAN OF THE LORD (1927).
22The details of the litigation are fully set forth in Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 2, at 295-301.
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aforesaid did not violate the right of freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States." 2 It was an arresting commentary on the vitality of the constitutional issue that at that late date the New York high court did not
think it serious enough to warrant an opinion. The hope that the Supreme Court would make both law and history in reviewing this case
was dissipated when its judgment came down. The Court had divided
evenly, thus affirming the conviction. 24 Following tradition in evenly
divided decisions, there was no opinion. 25 The possibility of such division had resulted from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's recusation because
he was a personal friend of Wilson's. If it revealed nothing else, however, the judgment served notice on the legal world that the constitutional issue was an open question.
II. BUTLER V. MICHIGAN

In 1956 the Court's first important decision in the obscenity
area, Butler v. Michigan,2 6 appeared to dig deeper the hole in which
the Court would find itself when it faced the constitutional issue directly. Butler involved a conviction under a Michigan statute which
made it a crime to "publish materials tending to incite minors to
violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth ....,2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for a unanimous Court, held the statute unconstitutional. He read the
statute as making it an offense to sell to the general public a book that
might have a deleterious influence on the young.
The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading
public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in
order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to
promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to
roast the pig. Indeed, the Solicitor General of Michigan has, with
characteristic candor, advised the Court that Michigan has a
statute specifically designed to protect its children against obscene
21People v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687 (1947).

21Doubleday & Co.v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
26The tradition was recently shattered in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263 (1960).
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
27Id.at 381.
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matter "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." But
the appellant was not convicted for violating this statute.
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the
evil with which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment
is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what
is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free
society .... 28
The Butler case thus appeared to do little more than underwrite the
shift in the test audience, from the young and vulnerable to the average adult, when the item in question is distributed to the general public. The point had been brilliantly made by Judge Learned Hand more
than forty years earlier in United States v. Kennerley29 when, although
following the Hicklin rule, he added the following dissenting dictum:
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down,
however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not
seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of the
present time, as conveyed by the words, "obscene, lewd, or
lascivious." I question whether in the end men will regard that as
obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of
innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that truth and
beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in the
interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses. Indeed,
it seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our
interest in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce
our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and
beautiful sides of human nature. That such latitude gives opportunity for its abuse is true enough; there will be, as there are,
plenty who will misuse the privilege as a cover for lewdness and a
stalking horse from which to strike at purity, but that is true today and only involves us in the same question of fact which we hope
that we have the power to answer.
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that
which is honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may
mince its words, still I scarcely think that they would forbid all
which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that society is prepared to accept for its own limitations those which may perhaps be
28Id. at 383-84.
"

209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).

HeinOnline -- 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 6 1960

METAPHYSICS OF THE LAW OF OBSCENITY

7

necessary to the weakest of its members. If there be no abstract
definition, such as I have suggested, should not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may
have arrived here and now? If letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of what is right, it would seem
that a jury should in each case establish the standard much as they
do in cases of negligence. To put thought in leash to the average
conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the
necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy.30
In fact, however, the Butler case cuts deeper. The Court was saying
that the average adult is not merely the preferred test audience for
materials distributed generally; it is the constitutionally required test
audience. Moreover, if the state cannot bar materials generally distributed by using their impact on youth as a criterion of obscenity, it
cannot use the young at all as a justification for regulation. That is,
the state cannot justify regulation on the ground that the regulated
materials might move the young to antisocial conduct, or might excite
the sexual imagination of the young, or might make premature disclosure of the "facts of life" to the young in a vulgar and debased
form. Admittedly these are serious problems, particularly the last.
They may well justify intervention of the state keyed specifically to
distributions to children. But so far as distribution of materials to the
general public is concerned the impact on the young has now become
irrelevant. If general publications not specifically aimed at children
are to be banned as obscene, it can only be because of their effect on
the adult audience, because of their impact on the average adult who
is sexually experienced and mature. The Butler decision thus served to
sharpen the constitutional debate that would attend a decision on the
constitutionality of general obscenity statutes.

III.

ALBERTS AND ROTH

The Court finally reached the constitutional issue in 1956 in
two cases which were heard and decided together: People v. Alberts
and United States v. Roth." In the Alberts case, a conviction was based
on a California statute which made the distribution of obscene mate'0 Id. at 120-21.
1 354 U.S. 476 (1956).
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rials a crime. The Roth case involved a federal statute making criminal
the transmission of obscene materials through the mails. The Court,
agreeing that this was the first time the constitutional issue had been
"squarely presented" to it under either the First or the Fourteenth
Amendment, sustained the validity of both the federal and the state
regulation. The opinion of the majority was by Mr. Justice Brennan;
Mr. ChiefJustice Warren filed a separate concurring opinion; Justices
Black and Douglas dissented; and Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in
Alberts and dissented in Roth.
The majority opinion, although it decisively and unequivocally disposed of doubts as to constitutionality, did so by a route which neatly
bypassed all the perplexities raised by Judges Bok and Frank and the
commentators. Mr. Justice Brennan began by stating the question in a
fashion that clearly foreshadowed the answer: "The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected
speech and press." 32 The question could be put differently. 33 Mr.
Justice Harlan asked whether the particular materials before the Court
could constitutionally be subjected to regulation. For Justices Black
and Douglas the question was whether the state could use the criminal
law to regulate speech and letters to prevent the alleged evils of
obscenity. The Court's beginning was thus reminiscent of its strategy
in Dennis, 34 where it limited certiorari to the question whether advocating the violent overthrow of government could be constitutionally punished. The difficulty with this approach, as both Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Harlan were quick to point out, is
that the Court was thereby deciding an abstract question cut off from
the color and context of particular circumstances. One can only assume that the referents for "obscenity" in the minds of the majority
of justices as they dealt with the question were certain well-known
four-letter Anglo-Saxon words, or images of "French postcards."
Yet the last time the Court had had the question, the referent was
Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County.
Having thus stated the issue, Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded
2

Id. at 481.

33The grant of certiorari in Roth was limited to the questions whether the federal

obscenity statute was constitutional under the First, Ninth, and Tenth amendments. 352
U.S. 964 (1957). Alberts came up by way of appeal from a state court. 352 U.S. 962
(1957). The issues there, too, were limited to federal constitutional questions.
34Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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quickly to its disposition. He first noted that, although it had never
passed on the question, the Court had severai times previously appeared to assume its constitutionality in dicta. The First Amendment, in light of colonial history, cannot be read as intended to "protect every utterance. ' 35 This argument is curious. Because thirteen
of the fourteen states which ratified the Constitution had laws prohibiting libel, profanity, and blasphemy, he concluded that obscenity
is without constitutional protection. There are at least two difficulties here. The Court seems to have assumed that the only argument
against the constitutionality of obscenity regulation rests on the
broad premise that under the First Amendment no utterances can be
prohibited and that if this broad premise were destroyed the argument must collapse. Further, the Court's use of history was so casual
as to be alarming in terms of what other propositions might be proved
by the same technique. Is it clear, for example, that blasphemy can
constitutionally be made a crime today? And what would the Court
say to an argument along the same lines appealing to the Sedition Act
of 1798 as justification for the truly liberty-defeating crime of seditious libel?
The opinion then proceeded to the crux of the matter. "All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate
of opinion" are protected against governmental restraint. Obscenity
on the other hand is "utterly without redeeming social importance."3
This is clear from the fact that over fifty nations have entered into
international agreements for its regulation, and twenty obscenity laws
have been enacted by Congress in the last century. The Court then
quoted Chaplinsky3 7 to the effect that "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas . . ." and concluded: "We hold
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press."3 8
The opinion, however, was not yet finished. The most interesting
part was to come. Mr. Justice Brennan turned to meet the challenge
that there must be a clear and present danger of something to justify
35 354

U.S. at 483.

"Id. at 484.

3 Chapinasky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
38354 U.S. at 485.

HeinOnline -- 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 9 1960

10

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

regulation of speech. He is thus on the very threshold of the perplexities which so entranced Judge Frank. He disposed of them with one
quick thrust: since obscenity is not in the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is, quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois,39 "unnecessary
either for us or for the state courts to consider the issues behind the
phrase 'clear and present danger.' "The Court thus found further use
for the two-level free-speech theory which made its first appearance
in Chaplinsky and was given status as doctrine in Beauharnais.The
spectacular dilemma predicted for the Court when it confronted the
perplexities of obscenity regulation turned out to have no horns at all.
The perplexities may be puzzling but, the Court said, they are simply
not relevant.
After putting obscenity so securely beyond the pale of constitutional concern, Mr. Justice Brennan hastened to add a good word on
behalf of sex: "Sex and obscenity are not synonymous."' 40 Then followed what must be the least controversial utterance in the Court's
history: "Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through
the ages."'" But obscene discussions of sex are not entitled to the protection afforded fundamental freedoms. "It is therefore vital that the
standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom
of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner
' 42
appealing to prurient interests.
The Brennan opinion invites three lines of consideration. First, is
the two-level theory of free speech tolerable as doctrine? Second, is
there disclosed a weakness in the preoccupation of free-speech theory
with competition in the market place of ideas when we turn to art and
belles-lettres, which deal primarily with the imagination and not with
lideas in any strict sense? Finally, will the tendency of the Court's
decision be to relax or to make more restrictive the enforcement of
the obscenity laws?
The two-level speech theory, although it afforded the Court a
statesmanlike way around a dilemma, seems difficult to accept as doctrine. It is perhaps understandable in the context of Chaplinsky, where
393743 U.S. 250 (1952).
U.S. at 487.

40 354

41Ibid.
41Id. at 488.
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the speech in question is nothing more complex than the utterance
"son of a bitch," said rapidly. In connection with libel, as in Beauharnais,or obscenity, as in Roth, however, it seems a strained effort to
trap a problem. At one level there are communications which, even
though odious to the majority opinion of the day, even though expressive of the thought we hate, are entitled to be measured against
the clear-and-present-danger criterion. At another level are communications apparently so worthless as not to require any extensive
judicial effort to determine whether they can be prohibited. There is
to be freedom for the thought we hate, but not for the candor we deplore. The doctrinal apparatus is thus quite intricate. In determining
the constitutionality of any ban on a communication, the first question
is whether it belongs to a category that has any social utility. If it
does not, it may be banned. If it does, there is a further question of
measuring the clarity and proximity and gravity of any danger from
it. It is thus apparent that the issue of social utility of a communication has become as crucial a part of our theory as the issue of its danger. Although the Court has not yet made this clear it must be assumed that the Court's concern is with the utility of a category of
communication rather than with a particular instance. Thus, to go
back to the pamphlet in Gitlow,13 presumably the question, were the
case to arise today, would be about the social utility of revolutionary
speech and not the utility of the particular pamphlet which so bored
Mr. Justice Holmes. 44 There is, to be sure, no quarrel with the
premise that even odious revolutionary speech has value. If a man is
seriously enough at odds with society to advocate violent revolution,
his speech has utility not because advocating revolution is useful but
because such serious criticism should be heard. No one advocates
violent overthrow of government without advancing some premises
in favor of his conclusion. It is the premises and not the conclusion
that are worth protecting. This is in effect what Judge Hand meant
in the Denniscase when he spoke of utterances which have a "double
aspect: i.e., when persuasion and instigation were inseparably confused.""5 There is thus no contradiction in the concept of speech
4sGitlow

v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

0

44"But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us, it had no

chance of starting a present conflagration." Id. at 673.
45United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1959).
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which presents a clear and present danger but which nevertheless has
sufficient social utility to require close constitutional scrutiny. The
difficulties are with the other half of the theory, with the categories of
speech that have no social utility. Neither in Beauharnaisnor in Roth

has the Court spoken at any length about the concept of social utility.
It has confined itself on each occasion to the historical point that these
categories-libel and obscenity-have long been regarded as worth-

less speech subject to prohibition. But, if history alone is to be the
guide, the same inference might better be drawn about the utility of
revolutionary speech.

It is at this point that Mr. Justice Brennan's phrasing of "the dispositive question" bears strange fruit. It seems hardly fair to ask:
what is the social utility of obscenity? Rather the question is: what is

the social utility of excessively candid and explicit discussions of sex?
Here too there is the problem of the mixed utterance. The well-

known sexual passages in Lady Chatterley's Lover are integral to the
possibly strange but indubitably serious view of English postwar life
that Lawrence wished to portray. And even if they were not a part of
a complex whole-which will be destroyed with them if the novel is

held obscene, just as the critical premises of the revolutionary would
disappear-they would appear to have some value in their own right
as a lyrical view4" of the potential for warmth, tenderness, and vitality
4 As antidote to this assessment of Lawrence's achievement in writing about physical
love, reference should be made to a deadly and delightful critique by Katherine Anne
Porter, A Wreathfor the Gamekeeper, 14 ENCOUNTER 69 (Feb. 1960), in which she speaks
of "his blood-chilling anatomy of the activities of the rutting season between two rather
dull persons .. " Generous quotation is irresistible: "When I first read Lady Chatterley's
,Lover, thirty years ago, I thought it a dreary, sad performance with some passages of
unintentional hilarious low comedy, one scene at least simply beyond belief in a book
written with such inflamed apostolic solemnity.... I wish only to say that I think ...
he was about as wrong as can be on the whole subject of sex, and that he wrote a very
laboriously bad book to prove it.... We cannot and should not try to hallow these words
because they are not hallowed and were never meant to be. The attempt to make pure,
tender, sensitive, washed-in-the-blood-of-the-lamb words out of words whose whole
intention, function, place in our language is meant to be exactly the opposite is sentimentality, and of a very low order.... Sex shouldn't be that kind of hard work, nor should
it, as this book promises, lead to such a dull future. For nowhere in this sad history can
you see anything but a long, dull grey, monotonous chain of days, lightened now and then
by a sexual bout. I can't hear any music, or poetry, or the voices of friends, or children.
There is no wine, no food, no sleep nor refreshment, no laughter, no rest nor quiet-no
love.... If a novelist is going to be so opinionated and obstinate and crazed on so many
subjects he will need to be a Tolstoy, not a Lawrence. ... Lawrence constantly describes
what the man did, but tells us with great authority what the womanffelt... The inepti-
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of a fully satisfactory sexual experience. The Court's formula thus
seems to have oversimplified the problem. The Court may understand
obscenity, but it does not seem to understand sex.
The oversimplification is irritating because the Court appeared
unaware, as it could not have been, of the distinguished items that
have been held obscene. A legal term gets its meaning from the construction put on it by the courts, and the Court's logic thus appears to
lead to the conclusion that, in its view, such books as Lady Chatterley's Lover, Memoirs of Hecate County, and Strange Fruit, all of
which have been held obscene by distinguished courts, are in the category of speech which is "utterly without redeeming social importance."
I do not think the Court meant to say this-to say, for example,
that Memoirs of Hecate County is worthless. There is an obvious way
to avoid the apparent reductio ad absurdum. Presumably, in the future,
the Court will take it. For everything now depends on what is meant
by obscene. If the Court's formula is to make any sense, it must place
a heavy burden on the definition of obscenity. Obscenity must be so
defined as to save any serious, complex piece ofwriting or art, regardless of the unconventionality of its candor. If the obscene is constitutionally subject to ban because it is worthless, it must follow that the
obscene can include only that which is worthless. This approach
makes sense. So-called hard-core pornography involves discussions of
sex which are not integral parts of anything else. In themselves, they
are, at best, fantasies of sexual prowess and response unrelated to the
serious human concern that moved Lawrence and, at worst, a degrading, hostile, alien view of the sexual experience. If the socially worthless criterion is taken seriously, the Roth opinion may have made a
major advance in liberating literature and art from the shadow of the
censor.
The Court's approach touches another long-standing puzzle in the
law of obscenity. Is there a category of privileged obscenity, using
privilege in its technical legal sense? It has long been clear that certain
classics-Aristophanes, Rabelais, Boccaccio, Shakespeare, Montaigne, Voltaire, Balzac, and, some would add, the Bible itself-have
been immune from obscenity regulation. The Court has never extudes of these awful little love-scenes seem heart-breaking-that a man of such gifts
should have lived so long and learned no more about love than that!"
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plicitly held that the other values of a work make privileged its obscene parts; but the pattern of decision and prosecution has been
clear. The abortive effort of the Postmaster a few years back to bar
Lysistrata was greeted with, and defeated by, laughter. Judge Frank
argued that the judges had written such a privilege into the law and
had thereby given the game away:
To the argument that such books (and such reproductions of
famous paintings and works of sculpture) fall within the statutory
ban, the courts have answered that they are "classics"-books of
"literary distinction" or works which have "an accepted place in
the arts," including, so this court has held, Ovid's Art of Love and
Boccaccio's Decameron. There is a "curious dilemma" involved in
this answer that the statute condemns "only books which are dull
and without merit," that in no event will the statute be applied to
the "classics," i.e., books "of literary distinction." The courts
have not explained how they escape that dilemma, but instead seem
to have gone to sleep (although rather uncomfortably) or, its horns.
This dilemma would seem to show up the basic constitutional
flaw in the statute: No one can reconcile the currently accepted
test of obscenity with the immunity of such "classics" as e.g.,
Aristophanes' Lysistrata, Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, Rabelais'
Gargantua and Pantagruel, Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis,
Fielding's Tom Jones, or Balzac's Droll Stories. For such "obscene" writings, just because of their greater artistry and charm,
will presumably have far greater influence on readers than dull
inartistic writings.
The truth is that the courts have excepted the "classics" from
the federal obscenity statute, since otherwise most Americans
would be deprived of access to many masterpieces of literature and
the pictorial arts, and a statute yielding such deprivation would not
only be laughably absurd but would squarely oppose the intention
of the cultivated men who framed and adopted the First Amendment.
This exception-nowhere to be found in the statute--is a judgemade device invented to avoid that absurdity. The fact that the
judges have felt the necessity of seeking that avoidance, serves to
suggest forcibly that the statute, in its attempt to control what our
citizens may read and see, violates the First Amendment. For no
one can rationally justify the judge-made exception .... 47
While the unperplexed blandness of the Court's majority opinion
in Roth is disconcerting in the teeth of so vigorous and engaging a
'7237 F. 2d 796, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1956).
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commentary in the court below, it is probably true that the Court has
solved Judge Frank's dilemma. On the two-level theory, the classics
do not need a special privilege; they fall automatically into speech on
the first level, and hence automatically outside the realm of the constitutionally obscene. To put this another way, the Court is giving a
constitutional privilege to all communication that has some social.
value. And Judge Frank's pointed query as to why obscenity embedded in a classic was less dangerous than obscenity in a book without literary distinction is not so pointed now, since the latter is banned
not because it is dangerous but because it is worthless.
The Brennan opinion, however, remains curious on two grounds.
The Court did not make its own best point but defined obscenity substantially in the words of the American Law Institute's model penal
code: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." 4" This definition has certain advantages over its predecessors. It insists on the averageperson, on the
material considered as a 'whole, and on the dominant theme. But it
shares the central weakness of all prior legal definitions of obscenity:
the word is still defined in terms of itself. The key word "prurient" is
defined by one dictionary in terms of "lascivious longings" and
"lewd." The obscene, then, is that which appeals to an interest in the
obscene. In the process of defining obscenity the Court said nothing
about social worthlessness. The opinion thus failed to break sharply
enough with prior definitions of obscenity, to narrow them sufficiently, to make plausible its assumption that the obscene cannot include
materials of some social utility.
Moreover, it is unclear how the formula will help a future court
faced with the question whether a particular item can be banned
constitutionally. Everything now depends on the classification. If the
item is obscene it can be banned without regard to its danger. But in
any close case a court, in order to determine whether the item is
"obscene enough," will have to decide first whether it can be banned.
The Court's formula offers no guidance on the constitutional issue.
I suggest that the difficulties in working out the implications of the
new free-speech doctrine also reflect a difficulty with the older forms
of that doctrine. The classic defense of John Stuart Mill and the mod48

354 U.S. at 489; cf. id.at 487 andn. 20, citing A.L.I.,

MODEL PENAL CODE

(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1957).
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em defense of Alexander Meiklejohn 49 do not help much when the
question is why the novel, the poem, the painting, the drama, or the
piece of sculpture falls within the protection of the First Amendment.
Nor do the famous opinions of Hand, Holmes, and Brandeis. The emphasis is all on truth winning out in a fair fight between competing
ideas. The emphasis is clearest in Meiklejohn's argument that free
speech is indispensable to the informed citizenry required to make
democratic self-government work. The people need free speech because they vote. As a result his argument distinguishes sharply between public and private speech. Not all communications are relevant
to the political process. The people do not need novels or dramas or
paintings or poems because they will be called upon to vote.50 Art and
belles-lettres do not deal in such ideas-at least not good art or belleslettres--and it makes little sense here to talk, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
did in his great opinion in Whitney,5 of whether there is still time for
counter-speech. Thus there seems to be a hiatus in our basic freespeech theory.
I am not suggesting that the Court will have any hesitation in recognizing, not, as Keats would have it, that truth and beauty are one, but
that beauty has constitutional status too, and that the life of the imagination is as important to the human adult as the life of the intellect.
I do not think that the Court would find it difficult to protect Shakespeare, even though it is hard to enumerate the important ideas in the
plays and poems. I am only suggesting that Mr. Justice Brennan
might not have found it so easy to dismiss obscenity because it lacked
socially useful ideas if he had recognized that as to this point, at least,
obscenity is in the same position as all art and literature.
So much for the Court's response to the clear-and-present-danger
dilemma. What did it do with the objection about vagueness? The
Court was either disingenuous about, or indifferent to, the prior record of difficulties with the term, its own recent experience with
Hecate County, and the difficulties which become apparent upon any
introspective examination. Admittedly, Mr. Justice Brennan argued,
the terms of obscenity statutes "are not precise." But, citing and
4' MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960), a republication in expanded form of

his

(1948).
6DCf. Professor Chafee's review, affectionate but critical, of the Meiklejohn book, 62
HAv. L. REv. 891, 897 (1949), which makes much the same criticism.
FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

51Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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quoting the PetrilI5 2 case, he asserted: "All that is required is that the

language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.' 53
And the obscenity standards meet this test. The Roth case involved a
felony for which a five-year sentence could be imposed along with a
$5,000 fine. Yet, even for so serious a crime, the Court saw no difficulty.
Once again it was the Court's failure to break more sharply with
prior definitions of obscenity that makes its opinion unsatisfactory.
Although the whole approach seems to rest on a notion of hard-core
pornography, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, the Court chose not
to make a fresh start by attempting a definition of pornography. Perhaps most troublesome is the fact that the Court, despite Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissent, could see no connection between the workability of
its two-level theory and the objections about vagueness.
In the end, although the majority opinion in Roth has made several
major contributions to the law and should replace Queen v. Hicklin as
the key case in the field, it is unsatisfactory because in the teeth of
Judge Frank's stimulating opinion below and of Mr. Justice Harlan's
stimulating dissent in the Court, it appeared to find no difficulties.
It is unsatisfactory, too, because in an effort to solve the small problem of obscenity, it gave a major endorsement to the two-level theory
that may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free speech
generally.
The other opinions in the Roth case deserve comment as an index to
the unpersuasive quality of the majority opinion and to the full complexity of the issue as it is presented to the Court. The Chief Justice
filed a brief concurrence, full of caution as to the scope of what had
been decided. "I agree," he said, "with the result reached by the
Court in these cases, but, because we are operating in a field of expression and because broad language used here may eventually be
applied to the arts and sciences and freedom of communication generally, I would limit our decision to the facts before us and to the
validity of the statutes in question as applied." 54 He thought that both

defendants were "plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of
62 United States v.

Petrillo, 323 U.S. 1 (1947).

"3354 U.S. at 491.

1 Id. at 494.
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the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect."5
He concluded: "I believe the State and Federal Governments can constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that these cases present
to us, and that is all that we need to decide." 56 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren thus concurs in only two points: there is some material within
the category of the obscene which can be prohibited constitutionally
both at the state and federal level, and whatever it was that Roth and
Alberts were distributing, it was bad enough to fall within this category. Presumably Mr. Chief Justice Warren was not indorsing the
two-level theory or the revised definition of obscenity. In some future
case he could decide consistently with his opinion that some material,
although obscene within the new definition, could not be barred constitutionally. It is clear that the majority opinion had not put to rest
for him the perplexities of the theme.
As might have been anticipated, the First Amendment difficulties
which Mr. Justice Brennan so carefully muted exploded in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred. First, Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the tests used by the
trial judges and the revised test announced by the Court require only
the arousing of sexual thoughts; this he vigorously rejected as a sufficient predicate for government regulation. Second, he regarded the
fact that the trial judge in Roth used offensiveness to "the common
conscience of the community" as a test, as "more inimical still to
freedom of expression." 57 He argued that such a standard would
surely be unconstitutional "if religion, economics, politics, or philosophy were involved. How does it become a constitutional standard
when literature treating with sex is concerned?"5 8
It is thus apparent that the effectiveness of Mr. Justice Douglas'
dissent turned on his rejection of the two-level theory. He argued for
a single unified doctrine of free speech that would cover both ob"5d.at 496.
66Ibid.
57Id. at 511.
5sId. at 512. Some years ago I participated in a seminar on obscenity to which scholars

from various disciplines were invited. I particularly remember the point made by the
representative from Philosophy, Professor Charner M. Perry of the University of Chicago. He wondered how we would feel about restrictions on literature describing other
vices such as greed, cowardice, or gluttony in the same way that obscenity may be said to
be related to sexual intemperance.
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scenity and political speech. On that interpretation his argument is
irresistible, since the regulation of speech in other areas on the ground
that it aroused improper thoughts, or that it offended the common
conscience of the community, would surely fall.
Mr. Justice Douglas met the two-level theory squarely. The issue,
he said, cannot be avoided by saying that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment. The question remains, "What is the constitutional test of obscenity?" With the exception of Beauharnais,none
of the Court's prior cases have resolved free-speech issues by placing
"any form of expression beyond the pale" of the First Amendment.
And, unlike Beauharnais, there is "no special historical evidence" 59
that literature dealing with sex was intended to be treated in a special
manner. The first American obscenity decision did not come until
1821.60 More important, he challenged the basic idea of weighing the
social utility of speech: "The First Amendment... was designed to
preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of
speech against silence." 61 I think he put his finger firmly on the flmdamental difficulty of the two-level theory. It is to be hoped that the
force of his dissent will prevent the Court from adding any new categories of speech that are "without redeeming social importance." It
is thus clear that Justices Douglas and Black, like Judges Frank and
Bok, would favor unifying free-speech theory by requiring that there
be evidence of clear danger of action resulting from material dealing
with sex before they would permit it to be banned. As between the
competing embarrassments of invalidating obscenity legislation or
complicating free-speech theory, their choice is clear.
The most complex and interesting of the separate opinions is that
of Mr. Justice Harlan. It is apparent from his opening sentence that

the Court's opinion had not dispelled his doubts: "I find lurking
beneath its disarming generalizations a number of problems which...
leave me with serious misgivings as to the future effect of today's
decisions." 62
Mr. Justice Harlan's first point went to the abstract way in which
19Mr. Justice Douglas thought the history of the law of libel was, however, "wrongfully relied on" in Beauharnais. Id. at 514.
60Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2, at 324, n. 200, cite Commonwealth v. Holmes,
17 Mass. 336 (1821), as the "first reported" American case.
81354 U.S. at 514.

Id. at 496.
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the Court put the "dispositive question." "This sweeping formula
appears to me to beg the very question before us. The Court seems to
assume that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus of 'speech and press,'
which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy is
among other plants. On this basis the constitutionalquestion before us
simply becomes, as the Court says, whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and
the question whether a particularbook may be suppressed becomes a
mere matter of classification, of 'fact,' to be entrusted to a fact finder
and insulated from independent constitutional judgment." 63 Mr. Justice Harlan thus exposed the central weakness of the majority opinion: the difficulty in using the two-level theory where classification at
the first or second level depends on a key term as vague as obscenity.
The thrust of his objection, however, went to the implications for
judicial review of obscenity judgments. He objected that the classification as obscene, which under the Court's formula is decisive of the
constitutional question, will be made by the original trier of fact and
deferred to, thus encouraging the state and federal reviewing courts
"to rely on easy labelling and jury verdicts as a substitute for facing
up to the tough individual problems of constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case." 6 4 He asserted that no matter how a
jury labelled Ulysses or the Decameron, a conviction for selling those
books would raise "the gravest constitutional doubts." 65
Mr. Justice Harlan thus pointed up an important issue about judicial review in free-speech cases. Is not the issue of clear and present
danger, or the issue of obscenity, a constitutional fact which the reviewing court must decide for itself? This has been a troublesome and
clouded point in the clear-and-present-danger cases,6" but the case for
63Id. at 497.

6,Id. at 498.

65Ibid.

66In the Schenck case, and in his dissents in Abrams and Gidow, Mr. Justice Holmes,
although never explicit about the point, seemed to be making up his own mind as to
whether, under the circumstances, there was a clear and present danger in the speech.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624 (1919); Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925). In Gitlow the majority

opinion appeared to hold that the judgment of the danger can be made conclusively
by the legislature. In Dennis the confusion on the point is further confounded: the
majority accepted the trial judge's finding that there was a sufficient danger; Mr.
Justice Douglas argued that the danger must be found. by the jury; Mr. Justice Frankfurter deferred to the legislative judgment; Mr. Justice Jackson argued that the test is
unworkable when the Communist conspiracy is involved since no one would be in a
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such an independent reviewing judgment is stronger with issues of
obscenity. It seems to me clear, although the Court did not say so,
that obscenity is a constitutional fact. The majority opinion makes
sense only so long as the Court will be scrupulous and serious in
scrutinizing lower-court judgments as to what is obscene. Otherwise
the Court may be trapped into the absurdity of asserting that a work
like Ulysses is "utterly without social importance" because some
lower court has held that it was obscene.
Roth and Alberts are unfortunate cases from the point of view of
clarification of this issue, since the majority of justices appear to have
regarded the particular items as obscene beyond doubt." Hence, although Mr. Justice Brennan did not make an independent judgment
as to the obscenity of the items in this case, it does not necessarily
follow that he would not do so in a more troublesome case. I would
predict, therefore, that Mr. Justice Harlan's point as to independent
review will triumph as soon as the occasion arises, and that the Roth
case will liberalize the enforcement of obscenity statutes because
lower courts as well as the Supreme Court will feel the pressure of the
requirement that the item be "utterly without social importance,"
that it be "constitutionally obscene."
As one reads Mr. Justice Harlan's complaint about the abstract
way in which the Court put the question, the thought occurs that
Roth, too, is perhaps destined, like Dennis, to have its Yates aftermath,
with Mr. Justice Harlan writing the majority opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan's second point is of major interest. It will be
position to evaluate rationally when so complex a danger became "clear and present."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
667
Ie defendants in Roth had submitted the question: "Were the publications, when
considered in their entirety, obscene?" Petition for Certiorari, p. 3. By its limited grant of
certiorari, see note 33 supra, the Court excluded this question. Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion carried a foomote to the effect that "no issue is presented in either case concerning
the obscenity of the material involved." 354 U.S. at 481 n. 8. Mr. Justice Harlan did not
dissent from the limitation on the grant of certiorari in Roth and did not discuss the limitation in his opinion in Roth. He could, nonetheless, argue that the Court could not pass on
the constitutional issue it had accepted for review without making a judgment as to the
obscenity of the particular items involved. It might be noted that the material in Alberts,
as disclosed by the transcript, included exhibits with such titles as "Petting as an Erotic
Exercise," "Bestiality and the Law," "The Pleasures of the Torture Chamber." Record,
p. 13.
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recalled that it was not until Gitlo'w6" that the Court held that the
First Amendment was a restriction on the states. In his dissent in

Gitlow, Mr. Justice Holmes noted the possibility that the First
Amendment might apply less stringently to the states than to the federal government.6 9 Holmes, however, was content merely to note the

possibility. The point remained unnoticed until Mr. Justice Jackson
took it up vigorously in Beauharnais.7 1 He marshaled several arguments for his conclusion that the power of the states to regulate
speech is subject to different and lesser constitutional restrictions
than the power of the federal government. First, he argued from the
important differences in wording in the First and Fourteenth amend-

ments that "liberty" in the Fourteenth incorporates only the general
notion of such restraints as are essential to the concept of the "ordered liberty" of Palko.71 Second, he was properly concerned lest the
Court in Beauharnaisbe taken to imply that federal seditious libel laws

would be constitutional-a result which, he felt, has long been rejected by the Court and by American political practice. Third, he was

impressed with the number of states which had criminal libel laws on
their books then and at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. Fourth, he thought the functions of the state and federal governments are sufficiently different to warrant the use of different
68Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Mr. Justice Sanford disposed of the
point as follows: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at 666.
69
The Holmes caveat was as follows: "The general principle of free speech, it seems
to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by
the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States."
Id. at 672.
Judge Hand quoted the caveat in his review of precedents in Dennis. Speaking of the
Gidow case, Judge Hand said: "This case arose under state law, but all the judges agreed
that the First Amendment applied to it, though possibly without so strong a grip as
though it had been a federal law." 183 F. 2d 201, 208 (2d Cir. 1950). Chafee, however,
heads his chapter on Gitlow, "Victory out of Defeat." FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 318-25 (1948).
70343 U.S. at 287, 288-95. Although Mr. Justice Jackson would have given broader
power to the state, he nevertheless found the state statute in question unconstitutional
because it failed to preserve certain defenses in libel.
71Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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standards. The states should be allowed to experiment; libel is primarily a local concern; the interest of the federal government is
highly attenuated. Hence he saw a dilemma if we must either limit
the states to what is permissible for the federal government in the
regulation of speech or permit the federal government what is permissible to the states. He would eliminate the dilemma by applying
differential constitutional standards.
It is extraordinary that the distinction between the First and
Fourteenth should have been stressed only in the two cases, Beauharnais and Roth, in which the Court seriously employed the two-level
theory. Is this just coincidence or is there a relationship?72 Mr. Jus-

tice Jackson seemed concerned to avoid the need for a two-level theory by distinguishing between state and federal power. Since he could
accommodate the prevalence of state criminal libel laws by allowing
more constitutional leeway at the state level, he had no need for a
two-level theory to achieve the same purpose.
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, faced certain difficulties that did not
confront his predecessor. He did not reject outright the two-level
theory-and therefore left open the problem of what the two levels
are at the state tier and what they are at the federal tier. Doctrinal
niceties thus appear to be proliferating at a dizzy rate. Mr. Justice
Harlan made a determined effort to apply his separate state and federal criteria to the materials before the Court. He concurred in
Alberts because, constitutionally, the state should be permitted to
regulate obscenity on the ground that such material might influence
action either immediately or over a long period of time. This is especially true since the point is one of scientific controversy. "Nothing
in the Constitution requires California to accept as truth the most ad7 The tendency to dichotomize speech in order to accommodate the categories of
speech which are admittedly subject to control is an interesting one. Those who do so
appear to reject the thesis that all the speech which is subject to regulation can be deter-

mined solely by reliance on the clear-and-present-danger test. Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Beauharnais,and Mr. Justice Brennan, in Roth, advanced the two-level First
Amendment theory for the purpose of leaving the states at least free to regulate certain
non-dangerous categories of speech. Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn distinguishes between
public and private speech for much the same purpose: private speech is more vulnerable to
regulation. Like so many aspects of the Roth case and its successors, this is again a reminder of how incomplete is our basic free-speech theory. For a not very successful effort
to explore the reasons why the tort law of defamation is constitutional, see Kalven, The
Law of Defamation and the FirstAmendment, UNIVEwsrrY OF CHicAGo LAw SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON THE ARTS, PUBLISHING, AND THE LAw 3 (1952).
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vanced and sophisticated psychiatric opinion. It seems to me clear
that it is not irrational,in our present state of knowledge, to consider
that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state
may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society." 73 There are two
implications in this passage. First, in Mr. Justice Harlan's view the
state can regulate obscenity, not because it falls within a lower category of speech, but because the state has broader powers. Second, the
limit of the state's power is the familiar one, that the legislative judgment not be "irrational." In the Roth case, the problem is quite different. If a state bans a book, the ban holds only for that state, whereas
if the federal government does it, the ban holds for the entire country.
Then, too, the federal government has only an attentuated interest in
obscenity.7 4 Mr. Justice Harlan then made an interesting switch in
premises: the trial judge's charge would allow conviction for stirring
up sexual thoughts; the limited federal interest is not a basis for the
regulation of mere thoughts. Therefore, the conviction of Roth was
unconstitutional. He did not tell us whether the state can reach mere
thoughts, since he read the federal statute as turning on the stirring up
of sexual impulse and the state statute as turning on influencing conduct.
In dealing with the federal half of the question, Mr. Justice Harlan
did seem to reject the application of the two-level theory of the majority. He would not agree that a book which stirs sexual impulses is
necessarily "without redeeming social importance." "It is no answer
to say, as the Court does, that obscenity is not protected speech. The
point is that this statute, as here construed, defines obscenity so
widely that it encompasses matters which might very well be protected speech. I do not think that the federal statute can be constitutionally construed to reach other than what the Government has
73 354 U.S. at 501-2. (Emphasis added.)
74Counsel for Roth and for Alberts advanced arguments derived from federalism which
were amusingly contradictory. Roth's counsel argued that the federal obscenity statute
encroached upon powers reserved to the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-24. Albert's counsel, however, argued that since his was a
mail-order business the federal statute pre-empted the regulatory field as to people in his
category. Brief for the Appellant, pp. 108-19. The Court summarily rejected both contentions and, in passing, affirmed the use of the postal power as the basis for federal power
over obscenity. 354 U.S. at 492-94. Mr. Justice Harlan's discussions of the attenuated
federal interest, however, may foreshadow a critical re-examination of the basis for postal
censorship when and if that question reaches the Court again. See Comment, Obscenity
andthe Post Office: Removalfrom the Mail under Seetion 1461, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 354 (1960).
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termed as 'hard-core' pornography." 7 It is regrettable that Mr. Justice Harlan was unable to persuade the Court to shift to the new and
apparently narrower-if still undefined-concept of hard-core pornography.
The Harlan opinion, despite its elegance and apparent subtlety, is
full of unresolved difficulties. If he did not reject the two-level theory,
he applied it at neither the state nor the federal level. The test of state
power over speech is apparently that of ordinary substantive due process. The test of federal power is obscure, since there is no discussion
of clear and present danger. If the federal government cannot regulate
mere thoughts in this area, it may, nevertheless, reach hard-core pornography, which arguably does no more than stir sexual fantasy.
Apparently the federal government cannot reach action, as can the
states, on the doubtful ground of a connection between speech and
action.
The combination of the Brennan and Harlan opinions has thus created more free-speech doctrine than can be used sensibly. It would
seem to me monstrously complex to have a four-level speech theory.
And it would seem to me "burning the house to roast the pig" to
solve the obscenity problem at the price of reducing the constitutional control over the states to mere substantive due process, although Mr. Justice Frankfurter, to be sure, has long and ably argued
for this result in the political speech cases. 76 Further, if Mr. Justice
Harlan meant to reject the two-level theory, there is still the puzzle of
balancing the government's interest against the freedom involved.
That balance would be quite different for political speech than for
obscenity. Moreover, it is difficult, and I would add unwise, to read
Palko as meaning that only some of the basic notion of free speech is
integral to "ordered liberty." It has been difficult enough fr the
Court to decide which of the Bill of Rights are incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment; it should not assume the further burden of
deciding how much of each is incorporated. 77 In any event, it is abun75 354 U.S. at 507.
78See especially Mr. Justice Frankfiurrer's lengthy concurring opinion with appendix,
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1950).
77 This does not seem to be the same as the celebrated issue of whether the entire Bill
of Rights is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Adamson v. California, 332

U.S. 46 (1947). Presumably, those who argue for a total incorporation would reject the
Harlan-Jackson position on the First Amendment, but those who would hold with the
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dantly clear that the effort of the Court to deal with obscenity within
its commitment to free speech has opened issues about free speech
which transcend in importance the limited problem of obscenity.
Even more than the two-level theory of the Brennan opinion, the
split-level First Amendment theory of the Harlan opinion advances a
doctrine which could have the most profound impact on freedom of
speech. It is unfortunate that the collision of complex analyses in the
Brennan and Harlan opinions could not have been carried to more
explicit resolution.
The third of Mr. Justice Harlan's basic objections to the majority
opinion was that the Court had ignored differences between the two
statutes involved and, moreover, differences between the statutory
standards and the Court's definition of obscenity. It is partly these
differences which permitted him to reach different conclusions in the
state and in the federal cases. Yet the distinction drawn here, like
those in his opinions in

ates, 78 Barenblatt,79 and Lerner,8 ° reveal a

capacity to find satisfying distinctions that seem too fine for the ordinary mind. His proposition that the state statute defines obscenity
in terms of affecting conduct and the federal statute in terms of affecting thoughts is based on no significant difference in the wording of the
two statutes. Both statutes are confined to flat prohibitions of "the
obscene." Nor can reliance be placed on the constructions given by the
California court and by the trial judge's charge in Roth. The California test is whether the material has a tendency to corrupt by exciting
Palko "ordered liberty" criterion might still argue that all of the First Amendment is
incorporated in the Fourteenth.
78Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1958), where Mr. Justice Harlan
distinguished between "advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, but where such advocacy or
teaching is engaged in vith evil intent" from "advocacy directed at promoting unlawful
action." (Emphasis added.) The decision turned on the distinction.
79Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1959). Mr. Justice Harlan distinguished the pertinency of the questions asked the witness, Barenblatt, from the nonpertinency of the questions asked the witness, Watkins, in Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957). See Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meikljlm and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U.
Cm. L. REv. 315 (1960).

v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). See the distinctions made in the interpretation
of employee's silence under a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in Mr. Justice
Harlan's opinion in Lerner, and the Court's decision as to impermissible inferences from a
claim of th6 Fifth Amendment in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
It must be admitted, however, that in Yates, Barenblatt,and Lerner, Mr. Justice Harlan did
persuade a majority of the Court to accept his distinctions.
80 Lerner
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"lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.""' The charge to the
jury in Roth spoke of whether the material would arouse sexual desires or impure sexual thoughts in the average person.

2 1

frankly do

not see the difference. Both definitions emphasize impact on thoughts,
and the California court's reference to "the tendency to corrupt," I
suggest, is tautological; the court meant that the arousing of lascivious
thoughts necessarily corrupts. The elaborate structure of the Harlan
opinion collapses At this point: the neat symmetry is illusory. He did
not need the distinction between state and federal power to decide the
issues actually before him. Yet he ducked the interesting issue, in his
terms, of whether the state has the power to reach thoughts. He
put a strained interpretation on the two cases in order to have occasion
to sponsor a view of the constitutional inhibitions against regulation of
speech generally which may have grave consequences at the state
level.
His second distinction between the definitions in the two cases and
the Court's "prurient test" seems more solid. The Court avowedly
borrowed its definition from the American Law Institute's proposed
model penal code. Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that the draftsmen
explicitly rejected "the prevailing test of tendency to arouse lustful
thoughts or desires." 8 3 Unfortunately, he did not pursue this pointpursuit which might have led to an analysis of that curious term,
"prurient interest." It is not easy to see any difference between
"arousing lascivious thoughts" and having "an appeal to prurient,
that is lascivious interests." Further, although the A.L.I. draftsmen
rejected the traditional test because they thought it "unrealistically
broad" for our society, Mr. Justice Harlan is silent on whether the
"prevailing test" is constitutionally permissible as a test for the
states.
The Harlan critique does, however, expose another difficulty with
the majority opinion. Is the prurient test to be taken as the constitutional test of obscenity so that any substantial deviations from it must
raise a constitutional doubt? If so--and it would appear to be so" -

Mr. Justice Harlan's suggestion that the tests used in Roth and
Alberts are not the same as the prurient test raised a serious issue for
81354 U.S. at 501.
"2Id. at 490.
8 Id. at 499.
Court does state explicitly that the Hkklin test would be unconstitutionally "restrictive" but that the "prurient" test seems to provide adequate safeguards. 14. at 489,
84 The
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the majority as to the validity, in their own terms, of the two convictions. For if the prevailing tests, which were employed in both cases,
are different from the prurient-interest test, as the A.L.I. spokesmen
argued, then both defendants were convicted under tests of obscenity
that were broader and presumably more vague than the constitutional
test. It is a serious weakness of the Brennan opinion that it is not
more directly responsive to his point.
Whatever else might be said about Roth and Alberts, it is clear that
they will have a major effect, not only on future obscenity regulation,
but, for better or worse, on general free-speech doctrine as well.

IV.

KINGSLEY

PicruRts

CORP.

v. REGENTS

In the 1958 Term, the Court added another major decision on
obscenity. 5 It will be recalled that one possible evil was "thematic
obscenity," that is, the advocacy of improper sexual ethics.8 " In
People v. Friede8 7 thirty years earlier, a New York court found Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness obscene. The court found the book
well-written and compassionate, and in no sense vulgar or offensive in
its imagery, but too favorable toward homosexuality. The notion
that there could be obscene ideas as well as obscene images had seemed
particularly hard to square with developing free-speech doctrine. In
Kingsley, the issue came before the Court. Ironically, the Kingsley
case involved that most celebrated of obscenity causes, Lady Chatterley's Lover, but in the form of a motion picture rather than a book.
The New York Board of Regents had refused to license the picture.
The Supreme Court unanimously found this action unconstitutional.
The unanimity, however, ended with the decision. There were six
separate opinions. The proliferation of individual opinions in this case,
indicative of the continued difficulties of regulation of obscenity after
$5Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
85Recognition of this category of thematic obscenity is not inconsistent with my view
that belles-lettres properly do not deal in ideas. Thematic obscenity refers primarily to
novels in which sexually unconventional conduct does not meet with punishment. Thus,
Lady Chatterley's Lover is not an argument in favor of adultery but a story in which the

author is sympathetic to the illicit lovers and in which the plot does not show, as compared, for example, with Madame Rovary or Anna Karenina, that "adultery does not

pay."
$

133 Misc. 611 (Mag, Ct. N.Y. Co. 1929),
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Roth, is the kind of thing that the layman finds dismaying-not, it
must ruefully be admitted, without cause.
Kingsley involved another major problem of obscenity: the validity
of prior restraints. This is one of the major unresolved issues affecting
not only motion picture censorship but postal censorship' s and possibly censorship of books as well. It is clear that censorship in advance
of publication labors both under a bad name historically as well as
some special constitutional inhibition. It is clear also that the Court is
not prepared to say that all prior restraints are invalid. For several
years, the Court has studiously avoided deciding whether such restraints are bad when related to obscenity. Kingsley afforded one more
opportunity to pass on this issue; but only Justices Black and Douglas
accepted the invitation. In separate concurring opinions each argued
that the action of the Regents was bad because the entire New York
89
movie censorship scheme was an unconstitutional prior restraint.
The other opinions invalidated the Regents' action on the narrower
grounds which will be considered here. The opinion of the Court was
delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart. The New York statute under which
the Regents had acted permitted the refusal of a license if the picture
was "immoral." A recent amendment had amplified the definition of
immoral to include the presentation of "acts of sexual immorality...
expressly or impliedly ... as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns

of behavior."'90 Mr. Justice Stewart read the Regents' action as based
on the ground that the picture presented "adultery as proper behavior ... under certain circumstances."

91

Accepting this as the

definitive construction of the statute, he was faced squarely with the
issue of thematic obscenity and held squarely that the statute was
unconstitutional. He said:
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary
to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of
U See Comment, supranote 74.
82 On the prior restraint issue generally, see Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil
Liberties,4 VA rD. L. REv. 533, 537-45 (1951); Emerson, The Doctrineof PriorRestraint, 20
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955). The leading case has been Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), which is importantly construed in Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 445 (1957). See also the thoughtfiul opinion of Mr. Justice Shaefer, in American Civil
Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334 (1954).
9"360 U.S. at 685.
t Id. at 687-88.
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its citizenry. This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, 92
no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the
realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than
that which is unconvincing.9,
This ranks as one of the Court's clearest and most impressive utterances about free speech in general. Specifically, it means that one of
the possible target evils of obscenity regulation, the obscene theme,
has now been declared an unconstitutional predicate for government
intervention.
The Stewart opinion is also notably courageous in its apparent
willingness to allow those who would do so to put in a good word for
adultery. It is not without interest that the Court is willing to expose
itself to public criticism and embarrassment on this point but is
unwilling to do so on behalf of obscenity. The other justices, who felt
compelled to concur separately, do not appear to disagree with this
view or with the result.
Mr. Justice Clark agreed with the majority reading of the New
York statute but chose to put his decision on the ground he had advanced in the Burstyn94 case, that the criterion of "immorality" as
defined by the amendment was "too vague."
The only limits [sic] on the censor's discretion is his understanding
of what is included within the term "desirable, acceptable or
proper." This is nothing less than a roving commission in which
individual impressions become the yardstick of action, and result
in regulation in accordance with the beliefs of the individual censor
rather than regulation by law.95
92Mr. Justice Stewart did not note that Aristotle would disagree: "Not every action
or feeling however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some

essentially denote evil.... All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being
bad in themselves .... It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them--one
must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances,
for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and
in the right manner .... NICOMACHEAN&ETHIcs II, vi, 18-19 (Loeb Classical Library ed.
1926).
9a 360 U.S. at 688-89.
94 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
Is360 U.S. at 701.
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Thus Mr. Justice Clark, like Mr. Justice Stewart, found the statute
unconstitutional on its face.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each filed opinions with different
points of departure. They had in common two objections. First, that
the Court should not have found the statute bad on its face but only in
this particular application. Second, that the Court misread the construction of the statute by the New York Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion has familiar echoes of his earlier opinions on
free speech. After references to D. H. Lawrence's views on obscenity
and to a recent debate in Parliament, he proceeded to his main point:
Unless I misread the opinion of the Court, it strikes down the New
York legislation in order to escape the task of deciding whether a
particular picture is entitled to the protection of expression under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an exercise of the judicial function, however onerous or ungrateful, inheres in the very nature of
the judicial enforcement of the Due Process Clause. We cannot
escape such instance-by-instance, case-by-case application of the
clause in all varieties of situations that come before this Court.96
He then analogized the task at hand to that found in the confession
cases, the right-to-counsel cases, and the church-and-state cases. Such
careful balancing is inherent in the concept of due process. "The task
is onerous and exacting, demanding as it does the utmost discipline in
objectivity, the severest control of personal predilections. But it cannot be escaped, not even by disavowing that such is the nature of our
7
task."
However one may feel about the evils of doctrinaire liberalism
against which Mr. Justice Frankfurter has so valiantly fought, one
cannot, I think, be happy with this opinion. Justices Stewart and
Clark and Black and Douglas made valid general points about which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter chose to remain silent. Is thematic obscenity
constitutionally subject to state control? Is the two-level theory of
Roth operative here, where ideas about sexual morality are involved?
Is the New York statute too vague? Moreover, is Mr. Justice Frankfurter adopting Mr. Justice Harlan's view in Roth, that the First
Amendment has a different impact on the states, or is he arguing, as
his Dennisopinion suggested, that the problem reduces to the idea of
substantive due process at both the state and federal levels? Are
"Id. at 696.
7Id. at 697.
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prior restraints keyed to obscenity valid? With so many important
and pressing general questions in view, it is difficult to accept the
ideal of judicial self-restraint which would avoid passing on any of
them in order to praise the difficult process of marginal inclusion and
exclusion under the Due Process Clause. In his desire to avoid broad
libertarian generalizations, Mr. Justice Frankfurter generalized too
little. He is clear that the motion picture cannot be banned constitutionally, but he tells us almost nothing about the criteria that dictate
his judgment about this particular. The preoccupation with balancing
values in free-speech cases, although it steers clear of the doctrinaire,
comes precariously close to the opposite evil of the intuitive, particularized judgment which offers no guidance for the future.
Certainly Mr. Justice Frankfurter's colleagues were not happy
about his opinion. It struck angry sparks in the opinions of Justices
Douglas, Black, and Clark. The first commented on the irrelevance of
the references to England, which has no written Constitution and has
different assumptions about the roles of court and legislature. The
second (who, unlike his colleagues, refused to see the picture) spoke
wryly of the Court's becoming the Supreme Board of Censors, adding: "My belief is that this Court is about the most inappropriate
Supreme Board of Censors that could be found." 98 He added an
animadversion to the reference to D. H. Lawrence's view on obscenity. And Mr. Justice Clark noted that fifteen times in a fourteenpage opinion Chief Judge Conway had said that the picture was proscribed because of its espousal of sexual immorality-a remark aimed
directly at Mr. Justice Frankfurter's complaint about "culling a
phrase here and there" in misconstruing the decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals.
The sixth and last opinion in Kingsley is that of Mr. Justice Harlan,
in which Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker joined. It followed
closely the argument of the Frankfurter opinion but made more evident what it was that they found embarrassing in the holding that the
New York statute was unconstitutional on its face. A few years earlier the Court had dealt with another case involving La Ronde, to
which the Regents had denied a license on the ground that it was
"immoral." 9 9 The Court, in a one-line per curiam decision, had held
93 Id. at 690.
99 Communercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).

HeinOnline -- 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 32 1960

METAPHYSICS OF THE LAW OF OBSCENITY

33

the Regents' action unconstitutional, citing the Burstyn case. New
York had then tried to remedy the vagueness of the term "immorality" by the amendment defining it more fully. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion had made the familiar point that it is not the
province of the Supreme Court to meet the "recalcitrant problems of
legislative drafting. Ours is the vital but very limited task of scrutinizing the work of the draftsmen in order to determine whether they
have kept within the narrow limits of the kind of censorship which
even D. H. Lawrence deemed necessary."'1 I0 Yet it is clear that both
he and Mr. Justice Harlan were embarrassed at the idea of the Court's
once more sending the statute back to New York for redrafting. The
point is not so well taken in this instance, however, since the Court
was not rejecting the statute, as' Mr. Justice Clark would have done,
because it was too vague. It rejected it on grounds that give ample
advice to the draftsmen. Mr. Justice Harlan agreed that the "abstract" advocacy of adultery (which is certainly an interesting concept) may not be constitutionally prohibited but insisted that the
Court was misconstruing the New York interpretation of its statute.
He understood the New York Court of Appeals to have sustained a
ban on the espousal of adultery, either by "obscene portrayal or by
actual incitement," and found the statute, so construed, not unconstitutional on its face.' 01
Turning to the question of this application of the statute, Mr. Justice Harlan then affirmed his position in Roth, that the states have
wider latitude than the federal government. But even that latitude did
not permit them to bar this picture. Lady Chatterley's Lover was nothing more than a "somewhat unusual, and rather pathetic 'love tri100 360 U.S. at 694.
101

On the question whether Mr. Justice Harlan is correctly reading the statute, as
interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals, 4 N.Y. 2d 349 (1958), or whether Justices Stewart and Clark are correct, it must be admitted that the majority opinion of
Chief Judge Conway lends support to both views. In his description of the motion picture
of Lady Chatterley's Lover he highlights particular scenes he found offensive. See, especially, id. at 353. In what appears to be a summary of the issues, however, he states:
"Essentially, then, the question amounts to this: What can society do about protecting
itself from motion pictures which are corruptive of the public morals? We hold that it may
refuse to license a motion picture 'which alluringlyportrays adultery asproper behavior." Id. at
358. (Emphasis added.) After a close reading of the opinion, I would vote with the
Stewart-Clark interpretation, especially in view of the wording of the statute itself. I
would suggest that the difficulty arose because the Court did not recognize that the issue
was thematic obscenity and not literal advocacy. See note 86 supra.
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angle,' lacking in anything that could properly be termed obscene or
corruptive of the public morals by inciting the commission of adultery."' 12 Presumably, then, even the states cannot regulate ideas about
sexual behavior unless they are imbedded in obscene imagery or unless they amount to direct incitement. In short, ideas about sexual
behavior have the same constitutional status as ideas about anything
else--which was precisely Mr. Justice Stewart's point.
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, added a remarkable sentence, perhaps in an effort to dissociate himself from the self-righteous tone of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the question of making difficult individual
judgments. "Giving descriptive expression to what in matters of this
kind are in the last analysis bound to be but individual subjective impressions, objectively as one may try to discharge his duty as a judge,
is not apt to be repaying."'0 3 The candor is commendable, but the
remark plays directly into the hands of Mr. Justice Black, who complained that Justices Harlan and Frankfurter were substituting personal subjective judgment for constitutional rule.
The Kingsley case, then, if it added to the law on obscenity, also
disclosed even more explicitly than did Roth a major tension in freespeech doctrine between those judges who favor a clear statement of
ruling principle and those who favor a particularized balancing that is
inevitably personal. Once again an obscenity case opened up basic
04
issues transcending the problems of obscenity.'
202360 U.S. at 708.
103

Id. at 707.

104On the other hand, three other important decisions suggest that despite the vague-

ness of the standard, obscenity presents a constitutionally unique problem. The fact that
the Court sustained regulation of obscenity does not imply that it will easily sustain regulation under apparently kindred rubrics. The three cases are Burstyn v. Wilson, supra
note 94, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and Hannegan v. Esquire, supra note
10. They demonstrate that "sacrilege," "massed" descriptions ofviolence, and "vulgarity"
are not key words to avoidance of First Amendment limitations. And the rejection of"immorality" in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, supranote 99, as reinforced in Kingsley, is further evidence of a pronounced judicial hostility to legislation by analogy to "obscenity." In brief, it would appear that the ratification of the power to regulate obscenity
will not open wide the door to other regulation, however similar. The Court may feel
obliged to close its eyes to the vagueness of "obscenity" and to the incompatibility of its
sanction of obscenity regulation with free-speech doctrine, but it remains very sensitive to
the vagueness of comparable terms and their incompatability with the Court's commitrnepts to its announced freedom of speech rationales.
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SMITH V. CALIFORNIA

The most recent important decision on obscenity is Smith v.
California,"°5 decided in the 1959 Term. It provides a fitting conclusion
to the Court's recent work and may prove to be the most important decision on the subject yet rendered. The case was concerned with a Los
Angeles ordinance making it a crime for anyone to have in his possession for sale any obscene or indecent writing or book. The Court was
unanimous in holding the ordinance unconstitutional, but once again
there was a proliferation of separate opinions-this time five. The
defendant urged a series of arguments which had varied appeal for the
different justices. He asserted that the ordinance was bad because it
did not require scienter. He complained that the trial judge had excluded the testimony of experts as well as other evidence on the contemporary literary and moral standards of the community. And he
urged that the material in question was not obscene. None of the
justices reached the third point. They reacted differently to the other
two. The Smith case highlights two further important issues in the
regulation of obscenity: (1) The problem of the disseminator or bookseller who, as a practical matter, is far more likely than the author or
publisher to be the target of prosecution; (2) the relevance of external evidence of community standards to the delicate judgments of
obscenity and constitutionality.
The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan effectuated his promise in Roth to be vigilant in the scrutiny of obscenity prosecutions.
For him the fatal flaw in the ordinance was the absence of a requirement ofscienter.As Mr. Justice Brennan read the ordinance, a bookseller could be convicted although legitimately unaware of the contents of
the book. Because the Court had already upheld drug legislation imposing absolute criminal liability without scienter,1 6 Mr. Justice Brennan did not find the ordinance bad because it was unfair to the bookseller. Rather, he argued that if the seller were absolutely liable there
would be a serious clog in the free flow of communications, for the
seller would deal only in material with which he was acquainted and
which he regarded as safe. The result would be "a censorship by
booksellers" of non-obscene items. Thus the ordinance would effect
195 361 U.S.

147 (1959).

0 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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an unconstitutional interference with free speech and press. The case
thus posed a dilemma. If the state must prove that the seller knows
that the book is obscene, the state will have an impossible burden to
meet and the practical enforcement of obscenity laws will collapse.
On the other hand, if the presence of the book in the store is sufficient,
the seller will, as Mr. Justice Brennan reasoned, censor the books he
offers for sale.
Mr. Justice Brennan relented enough to suggest, in passing, that
something less than full scientermight suffice. But, following the tradition of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, he carefully noted: "We need not
and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of mental element
is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in stock."' 0 7 It is sufficient that
today the Court is considering a statute "which goes to the extent of
eliminating all mental elements from the crime."' 0 8
Two points in the majority opinion clamor for attention. First, it is
striking that the Court found a First Amendment violation because of
the indirect consequences of the ordinance. Normally restraints have
been direct, in the form of criminal penalty or refusal to license; no
conjecture has been necessary as to whether the free flow of communication will be affected. The very purpose of such regulation is
avowedly to ban circulation of the item. But the purpose of the
Los Angeles ordinance was not to turn booksellers into censors of
non-obscene items. To find that it would have this effect, the Court
must have speculated as to a chain of human behavior. In the attacks
on congressional investigating committees and the federal loyalty program, a principal point has been that they would have the effect of
discouraging free speech and free association by making people unduly cautious of what they said and what organizations they joined,
i.e., by turning them into censors of their own speech and choice of
associates. Although this argument of restraint by consequence won
some minority judicial support, the courts have steadfastly rejected it
as a basis for finding a First Amendment flaw in the procedures of the
110
congressional investigating committee'0 9 or the loyalty program.
107 361 U.S. at 154.

108 Id. at 155.
109See, e.g., United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d. 82 (2d Cir. 1947); Barskey v.
United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See also United States v. Rumnley, 345
U.S. 41 (1953); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barenblatt v. United
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It is, therefore, of no small interest that the Court accepted such reasoning here,' though admittedly the bookseller is a more strategic
link in the flow of public communication than the ordinary witness
before a committee or the ordinary government employee.
Second, the dilemma about scienter sharpens on reflection. The
Court was concerned primarily with the bookseller's knowledge of
the contents of the book, but Mr. Justice Brennan noted explicitly the
possibility "of honest mistake as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity.""n 2 If the Court were to require knowledge that
the book is obscene, it would indeed be difficult for the prosecution
ever to succeed: the defendant can always, with some plausibility,
argue that he did not think the item was obscene and is astonished
that others so view it. The objection as to the vagueness of "obscenity" which Mr. Justice Brennan dismissed so cavalierly in Roth
had risen again to haunt the Court. The vagueness argument may
have lost the battle but won the war, since the vagueness of obscenity
may so bedevil the efforts to prove scienter that the effective enforcement of regulation against the dissemination of obscene matter will
collapse at the prosecution of the bookseller, the key link in the chain
of distribution. It is difficult, however, to see why the seller should
receive more protection than the author or publisher. The latter have
to take the risk that the Court's judgment of what is obscene will not
agree with their own. This is precisely what the constitutional objection to vagueness means-that the law is so unclear that one cannot
tell whether he is committing a crime or not. Having once rejected
this point in Roth, the Court is not likely to accept it in the guise of
the scienter requirement in future prosecutions of booksellers.
The separate concurrences of Justices Black and Douglas were
hardly a surprise. They continued to advance their dissenting view in
Roth, that the regulation of obscenity by criminal sanction is unconStates, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
n' Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952); Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An
Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALE L. J.295 (1952).

u Itmay be that the Court is moving in the direction of accepting this "consequential
analysis" in First Amendment cases. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v

Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
In 361 U.S. at 154.
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stitutional. Hence the bookseller could not be validly prosecuted for
the dissemination of the obscene material because this is an unconstitutional predicate for a crime. In their view, the ordinance would be
equally unconstitutional however it handled the scienter requirement.
As in the Kingsley case, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred
in the result only. Mr. Justice Frankfurter hesitated either to accept
or to reject the Court's concern with scienter. He recognized that the
food and drug cases were no precedent for the issue here: "There is an
important difference in the scope of the power of a State to regulate
what feeds the belly and what feeds the brain.""' But he also felt that
the consequential impact of such ordinances on the non-obscene "cannot be of a nature to nullify for all practical purposes the power of the
State to deal with obscenity. ' " Having thus posed for himself the
dilemma that the Smith case raises, he neatly avoided it by finding the
critical flaw not in the wording of the ordinance but in the exclusion
by the trial judge of expert testimony on community standards.
In the course of his discussion Mr. Justice Frankfurter made two
interesting points. First, in an unusual turnabout, he complained that
the majority opinion had not given sufficient guidance to the state as
to how to draft a valid scienter requirement. "[L]nvalidating a statute
because a State dispenses altogether with the requirement of scienter
does require some indication of the scope and quality of scienter that
is required.""' Although he could be quoted against himself at length
on the narrow but vital function of the Court in scrutinizing the work
of legislative draftsmen, he scored a good point against the Brennan
opinion. It would indeed be difficult to draft an ordinance which would
be practically useful and yet would comply with the scienter requirement. The moral I draw is that there are serious weaknesses in Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's favorite doctrine of judicial economy.
Second, in his emphasis on the utility of expert testimony he was
directly responsive to the criticism that Mr. Justice Black made of his
views in the Kingsley case. Unless the testimony of such experts can
come in, the judicial judgment of obscenity, and hence of constitu113
Id. at 162.
114
Id. at 164.

m1Id. at 162. Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of course aware of the tension. He begins this
part of his opinion: "I am no friend of deciding a case beyond what the immediate controversy requires, particularly when the limits of constitutional power are at stake."
Id. at 161.
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tionality, will be "merely a subjective reflection of the taste or moral
outlook of individual jurors or individual judges." Thus it is the ascertainment of community standards that is to give the obscenity judgment an objective referent. Mr. Justice Frankfurter would thus add an
important gloss to the constitutional definition of obscenity in Roth:
whether the dominant appeal is to prurient interest measured by prevailing community standards is to be determined in part by expert
testimony. It is, therefore, unconstitutional to bar such testimony.
This view is strongly indorsed by Mr. Justice Harlan, and the English
have recently adopted it." There is nothing in the other opinions inconsistent with it. Although I am inclined to applaud this development, I cannot refrain from suggesting a few doubts. The experts apparently are to testify to literary standards and to community moral
standards rather than to psychological connections between words and
actions, or to psychiatric views of the harm that may be caused by
exposure to the obscene. Presumably, there are people who know
enough about literature to inform the Court of the status of Ulysses or
Hecate County or Lady Chatterley. But this the Court already knows.
When it comes to the prevailing moral standards, to the community
view of what is obscene, it is not at all clear what expertise is available. The Court appears to be inviting the well-publicized difficulty of
117
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Repouille case,
when it puzzled over the meaning of the "good moral character" requirement in the naturalization law in a most sympathetic case of
euthanasia.
I suggest that heavy reliance on expert testimony to objectivize the
obscenity judgment indicates once again how powerful the argument
is that obscenity is a fatally ambiguous concept. And I would echo
Mr. Justice Douglas' dismay in Roth that shock to the community
conscience is the test of permissible speech. Finally, I wonder whether
the only experts on the issue at hand are not the jury, as Judge Learned
Hand suggested years ago," 8 and whether the logic of Mr. Justice
116Obscene

Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66.

v. United States, 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947). See Note, Judicial Determination of Moral Conduct in Citizenship Hearings, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 138 (1948).
M United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156,157 (2d Cir. 1936): "As so often happens, the
problem is to find a passable compromise between opposing interests, whose relative importance, like that of all social or personal values, is incommensurable. We impose such a
117Repouille
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Frankfurter does not lead to the conclusion that the jury is the proper
constitutional arbiter of obscenity.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion is not on all fours with that of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter. He found a broader error in the trial. He objected not only to the refusal to permit expert testimony but also to
the refusal to permit more amateurish efforts by the defendant to
"compare the contents of the work with that of other allegedly similar publications which were openly published, sold and purchased,
and which received wide general acceptance." 119 The admission of
this evidence, like that of the experts, is a constitutional requirement
in the Harlan view.
The implications of the Harlan and Frankfurter opinions in Smith
for the conduct of obscenity defenses should not be minimized. Until
now an obscenity trial has been a rather pedestrian affair, with not
much more than the material itself as the evidence. Defense counsel
have been champing at the bit to introduce other evidence. If the
Frankfurter-Harlan position is given effect, the trial of an obscenity
case will not only be enlivened by a battle of experts but also by content analysis of lingerie advertisements, of bathing-suit photographs,
of the hidden and not so hidden sexual symbolism of all advertising,
and perhaps even of the content of ordinary speech and off-color
jokes. In brief, Life and the Saturday Evening Post will be called upon
to rescue Playboy and Esquire.
One final detail of the Harlan opinion remains to be noted. Once
again the Justice repeated his thesis of Roth, that the First Amendment applies less stringently to the states. Once again, none of the
other justices paid any attention to the point. And once again, as in
Kingsley, the distinction did not seem to guide Mr. Justice Harlan's
own opinion, since he found that the state had exceeded its constitutional power.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article began by noting four possible target evils of obscenity regulation. What has the Court said of them in the cases we
duty upon a jury because the standard they fix is likely to be an acceptable mesne, because
in such matters a mesne most nearly satisfies the moral demands of the community."
UQ 361 U.S. at 172.
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have examined? The majority in Roth used the two-level theory to
avoid saying anything. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground
that government could not control speech in an effort to control
thoughts, sexual or otherwise. Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand,
held that the state could regulate obscenity only on theory that it
affected conduct, but that the federal government could not regulate
it on the theory that it affected thoughts. Hence the twin evils of
arousing sexual behavior and of arousing sexual thoughts receive an
interesting pattern of rejection in the opinions. In the Kingsley case,
the third possible evil, thematic obscenity, was held by the majority
to be an unconstitutional basis for regulation in the name of obscenity.
There is left then only the fourth possible evil, the arousing of
revulsion and disgust in a non-captive adult audience.120 Thus far the
Court has had no occasion to speak to this point. The issue appears to
have been available in Roth since the federal statute uses the word
"filthy" along with "obscene, lewd, lascivious," and the trial judge
had defined "filthy" in his charge to the jury. The defendant had suggested the point in the Court of Appeals, resting his argument on
vagueness. Chief Judge Clark, quoting Learned Hand, found, however, that the trial judge's definition was adequate: " 'Filthy' pertains
to that sort of treatment of sexual matters in such a vulgar and indecent way, so that it tends to arouse a feeling of disgust and revulsion."'' In any event, the defendant had waived objections to the trial
judge's charge.
The point, however, is not that "filthy" is vague but that it points
to an evil of obscenity which is the exact opposite of that usually recognized: the obscene is bad because it is revolting, not because it is
alluring."2' Since it cannot be both at the same time for the same audience, it would be well to have more explicit guidance as to whicl
"IIt perhaps makes the point too easy to assume the audience is non-captive. Materials
may be sent unsolicited through the mails, and it is difficult to avoid the covers of magazines, paperbound books, and motion picture advertisements. But the famous controversies
over censorship all involve items where the community had to seek out voluntarily the
"shock" to its conscience.
u' United States v. Roth, 237 F. 2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1956).
'2 Judge Frank did not ignore this difficulty: "If the argument be sound that the legislature may constitutionally provide punishment for the obscene because, anti-socially, it
arouses sexual desires by making sex attractive, then it follows that whatever makes sex
disgusting is socially beneficial-and thus not the subject of valid legislation which punishes the mailing of 'filthy' matter." Id. at 801, n. 2.
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objection controls. I suggest that the evil of arousing revulsion in
adults who are a non-captive audience is simply too trivial a predicate
for constitutional regulation. It is probable, especially since "filthy"
is still in the federal statute, that a case will arise when "arousing
revulsion" is part of the court's charge to a jury and the Court will
yet be faced with the issue and invited to fill this hiatus in its coverage
of the obscenity issues.
This account of the Court's encounter with obscenity would not be
complete without some reference to a series of three per curiam decisions that followed Roth. Ordinarily a per curiam decision makes thin
reading, but these three cases serve to mark, more distinctly than the
facts in either Kingsley or Smith permitted, how the Court will interpret the definition of obscenity advanced in Roth. They serve, too, as
the basis for a hypothesis which Thurman Arnold has voiced in a
recent brief to the Supreme Court of Vermont as to what the Court's
strategy will be in future obscenity cases.
The three per curiam cases are One, Inc. v. Olesen,121 Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield, 24 and Times Film Corp. v. Chicago.121The first
two cases involved magazines and the third a motion picture. In One,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held a magazine with
a homosexual slant to be clearly obscene, saying that it was "offensive
to the moral senses, morally depraving and debasing, and that it is2
designed for persons having lecherous and salacious proclivities.'1 1
In the Sunshine Book case, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed, not without dissent, the trial judge's finding,
based on a meticulous examination of each photograph,127 that the
-3 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F. 2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
-4 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249 F. 2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
-6 355 U.S. 35 (1958), reversing 244 F. 2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
m 241 F. 2d at 778.
127The

trial judge discussed each photo in detail. The following is a fair example of the

process: "On page 11there is a picture of three females ... the mother is obese, short,
stocky, has large flat breasts; the pubic area is somewhat shaded by shadow; the pubic

hair is matted; the over-all picture is one of vulgarity, filth, obscenity and dirt. But the
photographer in taking this picture has caused the two girls to turn to a side view and the
sunshine clearly shows the fine, soft texture of pubic hair of the adolescent girls, and
accordingly the Court finds the picture is obscene, lewd, and lascivious." 128 F. Supp. at

572. Mr. Arnold says of the judge's efforts: "Here the judge, feeling compelled to apply
the majority standards in the Roth case, did analyze the magazine picture by picture. The
language he had to use describing the pictures is more repellent than the pictures them-
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pictures in a nudist magazine were obscene. And in the Times Film
case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after seeing the
motion picture, found "that, from beginning to end, the thread of the
story is supercharged with a current of lewdness generated by a series
of illicit sexual intimacies and acts ....
The narrative is graphically
pictured with nothing omitted except those sexual consummations
which are plainly suggested but meaningfully omitted and thus, by the
very fact of omission, emphasized."128 It held that the motion picture
was clearly obscene. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all three
cases. In each case it reversed per curiam, citing only the Roth case.
These three decisions, coupled with the citation of Roth, point unmistakably in one direction: the Court is feeling the pressure generated
by the two-level theory to restrict obscenity to the worthless and
hence to something akin to hard-core pornography. Thus the three
decisions appear to add an important gloss to the Roth definition. And
the prophecy that Roth would serve to narrow the range of obscenity
regulation appears fulfilled.
It is at this point that Mr. Arnold enters with the appropriate last
word. Having been engaged as counsel for the defense in a prosecution in Vermont for the sale of an allegedly obscene magazine, he submitted a brief to the Vermont Supreme Court which must rank as
one of the more extraordinary briefs ever filed. The main point is
advice to the Vermont court on how to handle the issue before it
sensibly and diplomatically. Mr. Arnold purports to get his rule of
judicial prudence from the United States Supreme Court. The rule is
simple: the court should hold the items before it not obscene unless
they amount to hard-core pornography, and should, after rendering a
decision, shut up. In Mr. Arnold's view, any fool can quickly recognize hard-core pornography, 129 but it is a fatal trap for judicial decorum and judicial sanity to attempt thereafter to write an opinion
explaining why:
selves." Brief for Respondent-Appellant in Vermont v. Verham News Corporation
(Windsor County Court, Docket #2779, Supreme Court, Docket #1305 [1959]), p. 22.
244 F. 2d at 436.
12 Although, as indicated, I would have preferred the Court explicitly to narrow the
legal definition of obscenity to hard-core pornography, I think Mr. Arnold is exaggerating
the ease of identifying the latter. One suspects that the touchstone is more likely to be the
social status of the publisher than the content of the item.
12
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Ordinarily when the Supreme Court grants certiorari and reverses per curiam without argument or submission of briefs it
means that the law was clear without argument. But it cannot be
said of these three cases that previous decisions compelled their
results. There must be a different reason for the Court's silence.
We think that reason becomes apparent from a reading of the hundreds of cases where the courts have tried to analyze the concepts
of obscenity and which we have refrained from citing because no
more unedifying section of judicial literature exists. Vermont has
indeed been fortunate in escaping it. The spectacle of a judge poring over the picture of some nude, trying to ascertain the extent to
which she arouses prurient interests, and then attempting to write
an opinion which explains the difference between that nude and
some other nude has elements of low comedy. Justice is supposed
to be a blind Goddess. The task of explaining why the words "sexual relations" are decent and some other word with the same
meaning is indecent is not one for which judicial techniques are
adapted.
It is our belief, therefore, that the Supreme Court's refusal to
write opinions in these three cases was exceedingly wise. No one
can reason why anything is or is not obscene.... What the Supreme Court is saying to the lower court judges is that ... if the

material is bad enough they can leave the case to a jury. If it isn't
the indictment should be dismissed or a verdict directed. This decision may be made at a glance. Studying the material for hours
doesn't tell a judge any more about its obscene character than he
knew when he first looked at it.
While it is apparent that the Supreme Court has adopted the
"hard core" pornography as a Constitutional test its use of the per
curiam opinion neatly avoided the trap of defining what "hard
core" pornography is. Such an attempt would have started the
futile and desperate game of definition all over again. As William
James, the great psychologist, said: "Such discussions are tedious
-not as hard subjects like physics or mathematics are tedious, but
as throwing feathers endlessly hour after hour is tedious.' ' 0
Mr. Arnold may well be right as to the Court's strategy. Like
Judge Frank and Judge Hand, he has a rich appreciation of the comic
aspects of judicial review of obscenity; and the Court, although it has
been notably solemn in its dealing with the theme, may have come to
see his point. "The Court evidently concluded that its actions must
speak for themselves in this field. This may be an unconventional way
of making law, but in the field of pornography it is certainly sound
130Op. cit. supra note 127, at pp. 21-22.
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judicial common sense.""'. The Arnold advice has a familiar ring-all
the Court can do in these cases is to make the difficult individual judgment; it can add little by way of generalization as to why. This is
very close indeed to the position of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
Obscenity, too, makes strange bedfellows.
I cannot leave the Court's efforts in this field. without a word about
the extraordinary difficulty of its task. The difficulties have, I think,
three main strands. First, there is the specific topic of obscenity itself,
a topic freighted with all the anxieties and hypocrisies of society's
attitude toward sex. I think it not unlikely that none of the justices
takes the evils of obscenity very seriously. Yet, as responsibly placed
1
men, understandably they cannot follow Judge Frank and say So. 12
There are few topics on which the public and the private views of a
person are so likely to diverge. And the justices are compelled by
their roles to express a sober public view of the matter. Second, when
they pass on the constitutionality of obscenity they come close to
major doctrine about free speech and free press. They cannot handle
obscenity issues, which they may not care much about, insulated
from the implications their decisions may have for free-speech issues
about which they do care. Finally, they perform their roles in an institutional context that necessarily raises issues about federalism, about
judicial review, about holding statutes unconstitutional on their face
or only in their application, about de novo review of constitutional
fact, about whether they should ever decide any more issues than they
are compelled to, and about whether they are obliged to give legislative draftsmen advice on how to cure the defects the Court may find
in their work. In brief, the most impressive aspect of their task is that
any decision must treat so many variables. The rest of us are fortunate indeed that our job is so much easier and less responsible.
13,Ibid.

21"
It is tempting to attempt an inventory of possible judicial roles in dealing with so
awkward a question as obscenity. Four such roles are visible. There is first the role of
urbane resignation which is best exemplified in the decisions of Learned Hand; next there
is the role of irreverent amusement which is best found in the opinions of Judge Frank and
in the opinions of Judge (and now defense counsel) Thurman Arnold; third there is the
stance of uncompromising concern with free speech which is shown in the responses of
Justices Black and Douglas; and finally there is the role of the responsible man of affairs
who feels that there are limits to what the public will tolerate a court's saying on so delicate
a topic-a role which, I think, is exemplified by most members of the Court.
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